Abstract. Matsui's linear cryptanalysis for iterated block ciphers is generalized to an attack called . This attack exploits a weakness that can be described by an e ective partition-pair, i.e., a partition of the plaintext set and a partition of the next-to-last-round output set such that, for every key, the next-to-last-round outputs are non-uniformly distributed over the blocks of the second partition when the plaintexts are chosen uniformly at random from a particular block of the rst partition. The last-round attack by is formalized and requirements for it to be successful are stated. The success probability is approximated and a procedure for nding e ective partition-pairs is formulated. The usefulness of is demonstrated by applying it successfully to six rounds of the DES.
Introduction
In cryptography, frequent use is made of iterated block ciphers in which a keyed function, called the round function, is iterated r times. Linear cryptanalysis , introduced by Matsui in Mat94b, Mat94a is a known-plaintext attack that requires the existence of unbalanced linear expressions". In HKM95 , linear cryptanalysis was generalized by replacing linear expressions with input output I O sums". In Har96, Har94 , an even more general attack called was introduced. This attack is based on the same principle as the statistical attacks independently developed in MPWW94 and Vau96 . Similarly to linear and di erential cryptanalysis BS93 , can be used to evaluate the strength of iterated block ciphers or to detect the existence of backdoors in such ciphers. This paper is intended to provide a thorough treatment of and, as a side bene t, to give additional insight into linear cryptanalysis.
In a last-round attack, many plaintext ciphertext-pairs, hereafter called p cpairs, are considered. For every considered ciphertext, one guesses the next-tolast-round output by decrypting the last-round with a guessed key. Then, one computes an empirical decision metric for this guessed key, which is an estimate of the expectation of some function of some random variable that depends on the plaintext and the guessed next-to-last round output. One repeats this computation for all last-round key guesses and chooses the key with largest empirical decision metric as the cryptanalyst's guess" for the actual last-round key.
In the last-round attack by the generalization of linear cryptanalysis , the empirical decision metric is the sample-mean estimate of the imbalance" of an I O sum". The imbalance of a binary random variable V is de ned to be IV := j2P V = 0 , 1j, where P V = 0 denotes the probability that V is 0.
An I O sum is a modulo-two sum of a balanced binary-valued function of the plaintext random variable and a balanced binary-valued function of the guessed next-to-last-round output random variable.
In , only p c-pairs whose plaintexts lie in some xed block of a partition of the plaintext set, called the input partition, are considered. Let Jk be the random variable specifying the block of some chosen output partition containing the guessed next-to-last round output, wherek is the guessed key used to decrypt the last round. The decision metric is an estimate of the imbalance" of Jk, where an imbalance of an m-ary random variable V is a measure for how nonuniformly distributed V is. The weakness exploited in is thus described by a partition-pair, i.e., a pair consisting of an input partition and an output partition, and we will introduce an imbalance to measure the e ectiveness of a partitionpair in . The success of relies on the fact that Jk is less balanced whenk is the true last-round key than whenk is a wrong guess.
In Section 2, we introduce some preliminaries. The last-round attack by is developed in Section 3. In Section 4, we give conditions for a successful attack. In Section 5, we consider ciphers in which a part of the round key is inserted by means of a group operation at the inputs to the rounds and we de ne cosetpartitions as partitions whose elements are the cosets of some subgroup with respect to this group operation. To apply , there must exist a su ciently e ective partition-pair and the cryptanalyst must have a practical method to nd it; in Section 6, we discuss such a method. In Section 7, we apply successfully to 6-round DES. We close in Section 8 with a summary of the main results.
In Appendix A, we formulate combined as an attack that combines several attacks by , which attacks exploit the same partition-pair but use p c-pairs with plaintexts from di erent blocks of the plaintext partition. In Appendix B, we approximate the success probability of . In Appendix C, we provide some details of the of 6-round DES.
Preliminaries
In this section, Y denotes the output of some keyed function whose input is X and whose key is Z, i.e., Y = Z X. It may be that is the round function of a cipher or the composition of several round functions. It may also be that is unkeyed and not invertible, as when is the function realized by an S-box of DES.
A partition of a set S is a nite set whose elements are pairwise-disjoint nonempty subsets of S whose union is S. These subsets are called the blocks of the partition.
De nition 1. Let F = fF 0 ; F 1 ; . . . ; F l,1 g and G = fG 0 ; G 1 ; . . . ; G m,1 g be partitions of the input set and the output set, respectively, of a keyed function Z .
The pair F; G is a partition-pair for if all blocks of F contain the same number at least two of elements, as also do all blocks of G, and if both l and m are at least two.
The blocks of the input partition F will be called input blocks and the blocks of the output partition G will be called output blocks. The function from the input set of onto f0; 1; . . . ; l , 1g that maps an element x to the index i of the block F i containing x will be called the partitioning function of F and denoted by f. Similarly, g will denote the partitioning function of G. Note that f and g are always balanced functions, i.e., functions that take on each of their possible values for the same number of arguments. We use capital letters X, Y , Z, etc., to denote random variables and the corresponding lowercase letters x, y, z, etc., to denote speci c values of these random variables. The experiment on which relies is the random experiment in which the plaintext and all round keys are chosen independently and uniformly at random over the appropriate sets. Note that, because all blocks of F have the same size, fX is uniformly distributed.
A function of an m-ary random variable taking on real values between 0 and 1, inclusive, and measuring how non-uniformly the random variable is distributed, will be called an imbalance. The imbalance of the random variable V will be denoted IV . We will consider two imbalance measures, namely, the peak The usefulness of a partition-pair for will be characterized by a partition-pair imbalance, which also lies between 0 and 1, inclusive.
De nition 2. Let F; G be a partition-pair for the function with input X and output Y and let I: be an imbalance measure for m-ary random variables where m = jGj. Let where I gY j fX=i denotes the average-key input-block-dependent imbalance of F; G for the input block F i . The imbalance IF; G of the partition-pair F; G can be calculated from the key-dependent transition probabilities p jji;z for 0 i l, 0 j m, and z in Z, where p jji;z is the conditional probability that the output Y = Z X lies in the output block G j given that the input X is chosen uniformly at random in the input block F i and that Z = z cf. Fig. 1 .
The partition-pair F; G will be said to have guaranteed transitions if its average-key imbalance is 1. Guaranteed transitions mean that, for each key, the block of G in which the output lies is uniquely determined by the key and the block of F in which the input lies, i.e., the key and the input block uniquely determine the output block. The partition-pair is e ective if its average-key imbalance is substantially greater than zero. This means that the output block is determined with substantially large probability by the key and by the input block.
In the following, we apply to iterated block ciphers as de ned in Fig. 2 .
3 Last-Round Attack by Partitioning Cryptanalysis
In the last-round attack by , we consider a partition-pair F; G for the keyed function consisting of the rst r , 1 rounds of a cipher. Such a partition-pair will be called an r , 1-round partition-pair. F and G are partitions of IB n so that the numbers m and l of blocks in these partitions must both be powers of 2. Typically, m will be 2, 4, 8, or 16, and l m. For the last-round attack, Z = K 1::r,1 and this key lies in the set K r,1 . Let F i be the input block used in the attack and suppose that N p c-pairs with plaintexts in F i are known.
The attack proceeds as follows. which is the key-dependent input-block dependent imbalance of the partitionpair F; G for the keyed function whose input is X, whose key is the concatenation of K 1::r andK, and whose output is R ,1
The last-round attack must in practice be speeded up by exploiting key equivalence". Two last-round keys k and k 0 are equivalent if there is a bijection of f0; 1; . . . ; m,1g such that gR ,1 k y = gR ,1 k 0 y for all y in IB n . Keys belonging to the same key equivalence class produce counter lists c k; 0 ; c k; 1 ; . . . ; c k; m,1 that di er only by a permutation and hence yield the same empirical decision metric so that they are indistinguishable by the attack. Therefore, we need to consider in Step 2 only one representative of each key equivalence class. We will writeK to denote a set containing exactly one representativek of each key class. Partitioning cryptanalysis determines only the class in which the true last-round key k r lies. This class is called the right class and its representative is the right keyk r . The other key classes are wrong classes and their representatives are wrong keysk w lying inK n fk r g.
The success probability p is the probability that the last-round attack outputs only the right key when the round keys are chosen independently and uniformly at random. The key-dependent success probability p k 1::r is the conditional probability of this event conditioned on the event that K 1::r = k 1::r . Note that p k 1::r depends on the input block used in the attack, but the success probability p is generally independent of this input block. In most cases of practical interest, p k 1::r is also independent of the actual value of k r .
The generalization of linear cryptanalysis in HKM95 exploits an r , 1-round I O sum where f and g are balanced binary-valued functions on IB n . The key-dependent imbalance of the I O sum S is de ned as ISjk 1::r,1 := j2 P S =0 j K 1::r,1 =k 1::r,1 ,1j HKM95 . Let F and G be the partitions whose partitioning functions are f and g, respectively. Then, IF; G j k 1::r,1 = IS 1::r,1 j k 1::r,1 . Thus, the last-round attack by performs a last-round generalized linear cryptanalysis attack with one di erence:
can Then, the hypothesis is that there exists a positive real number min , substantially larger than 0, such that, for virtually all k 1::r that can result from the cipher's key scheduling algorithm, I p k 1::r min . It is insightful to consider I p gR ,1 K Y j fX=i; K 1::rK =k 1::rk w as the key-dependent input-block-dependent imbalance of the partition-pair F; G for an r+1-round iterated" block cipher obtained by appending to the original cipher an r + 1-th round with round function R ,1 and round keyK. IfK is the right keyk r , then the r + 1 rounds collapse to r , 1 rounds, and the above imbalance equals I p gY r,1 j fX=i; K 1::r,1 = k 1::r,1 . Otherwise, for good ciphers, we would naturally expect the r +1-round partition-pair to have substantially lower key-dependent imbalance than an r,1-round partition-pair for virtually all keys K 1::r = k 1::r .
By assuming hypotheses similar to those that Matsui used for approximating the success probability of linear cryptanalysis , one nds that the success probability of can be approximated as 5 Coset-Partition-Pairs
Since there is generally an infeasibly large number of partitions with blocks of equal sizes, we must concentrate on partitions with properties that suggest their usefulness for . Many ciphers use a group operation to insert the round keys at the input of each round. For such ciphers, it is natural to consider cosetpartitions" of IB n with respect to this group operation.
De nition 3. Let " be a group operation in IB n and e the neutral element for ". A coset-partition for " is a partition F for which the block containing e, Fe, is a subgroup of IB n ; and whose other blocks are the cosets of this subgroup; i.e., a coset-partition is a partition that can be written as F = fx Fe : x2IB n g :
A coset-partition-pair is a partition-pair both of whose components are cosetpartitions. A coset-partition for the component-wise XOR operation on n-tuples will be called a linear partition and a partition-pair whose input and output partitions are both linear will be called a linear partition-pair. The following lemma gives a fundamental property of coset-partitions.
Lemma 4. Let z be the automorphism z : IB n ! IB n ; x 7 ! z x. A partition is a coset-partition for the group operation " in IB n if and only if, for every z in IB n , the automorphism z maps all elements of each block of F onto one block of F, i.e., if and only if the block containing z x is uniquely determined by z and by the block containing x, or, again equivalently, if and only if F; F has guaranteed transitions for ", i.e., for every z with z in IB n .
6 Finding E ective Partition-Pairs
We now suppose that the round function R of an iterated block cipher is de ned
where " is a group operation in IB n , where K i L and K i R denote the left and the right part of K i , and where :; k i R is invertible for all k i R . We propose a method for nding e ective coset-partition-pairs for such ciphers. For linear cryptanalysis and the attack in HKM95 , there exists a procedure for nding e ective linear expressions and e ective I O sums. With the help of Matsui's piling-up lemma, the imbalance of multi-round homomorphic I O sums can be lower bounded in terms of the imbalances of one-round homomorphic threefold sums HKM95 . Fortunately, the most e ective I O sums are often those for which this lower bound is the largest. For , there is no general way to compute a good lower bound on the imbalance of a multi-round partition-pair given imbalances of the one-round partition-pairs that it comprises. We must settle for approximating the average-key imbalance of a multi-round partition-pair.
Piling-up hypothesis for partition-pairs. Consider We have not been able to prove any result of this kind, but we have found experimentally that the piling-up approximation" 2 is often so descriptive of the actual average-key imbalance that it can safely be used for nding e ective multi-round partition-pairs.
Procedure for nding e ective -round coset-partition-pairs 1. Find the set S of all coset-partitions for ". 2. For all F; G in S 2 where jFj jGj, nd the imbalance of the partition-pair F; G for the input and the output of a round. Discard the partition-pairs with small imbalance from further consideration.
3. For each l; m, where l and m are powers of two with l m, consider all retained partition-pairs F; G in S 2 for the input of the rst and the output of the -th round with jFj = l and jGj = m; use the piling-up approximation 2 to estimate their average-key imbalance; nd the most e ective such partition-pairs and their approximate average-key imbalances.
4. Use 1 to approximate the success probability of . Decide for which l and for which m the most successful attack can be obtained.
The complexity of this procedure depends crucially on the number of cosetpartitions. For cyclic group operations of IB n , there are only n , 2 non-trivial coset-partitions, whereas there exist many more linear partitions. There seems to be little chance of nding an e ective partition-pair for ciphers using cyclic group operations on IB n and seems not to be powerful against such ciphers. For ciphers using bitwise XOR to insert the keys, there are so many coset-partitions that it is generally infeasible to compute the maximum speci ed in the piling-up hypothesis.
Partitioning Cryptanalysis of DES
We applied the last-round attack by to six rounds of the Data Encryption Standard DES. Details of this attack are given in Appendix C. For a certain partition-pair, we analyzed in our attack all 256 p c-pairs with plaintexts in one input block. The success probability was about 95 for using the Euclidean imbalance but was only 74 for using the peak imbalance Har96 . Our better success probability is about the same as that obtained by Biham and Shamir for di erential cryptanalysis of 6-round DES i.e., a success probability of 95 using 240 p c-pairs with chosen plaintexts BS93, page 31 , and it is slightly worse than the attack of Knudsen95, but a new weakness of 6-round DES is exploited in .
Conclusions
Partitioning cryptanalysis of iterated block ciphers was introduced. This is a generalization of linear cryptanalysis and exploits a weakness that can be described by an e ective partition-pair, i.e., a pair of partitions such that, for every key, the next-to-last-round outputs are substantially non-uniformly distributed over the blocks of the second partition when the plaintexts are chosen uniformly from a particular block of the rst partition. The success probability of was approximated by assuming hypotheses similar to those that Matsui assumed to estimate the success probability of linear cryptanalysis . The crucial problem of , namely the problem of nding e ective partition-pairs, was addressed. Our procedure for nding e ective coset-partition-pairs requires extensive computation for ciphers in which the round keys are inserted with the XOR operation. When the keys are inserted with group operations for large cyclic groups, our procedure is considerably faster, but the chance to nd an e ective partitionpair is generally small. To illustrate the potential usefulness of , we applied it to DES. For 6-round DES, attacks by are chosen-plaintext attacks that are about as successful as di erential cryptanalysis , although they are based on a di erent weakness. We close by remarking that ciphers that are very weak against , but quite strong against both linear and di erential cryptanalysis have been designed in Har96 . 
A Combined Partitioning Cryptanalysis
Partitioning cryptanalysis is a chosen-plaintext attack because only p c-pairs with plaintexts from one input block can be considered, but any input block in F can generally be used. We may extend to form a known-plaintext attack by combining attacks that use di erent input blocks in the following way.
0. Set up a counter c i;k; j for each i such that 0 i l, for each j such that 0 j m, and for eachk inK; and initialize all counters to 0. N as candidates for the key actually used in the last round. We will call this attack combinedCPC. The combined attack is similar to the attack by linear cryptanalysis using multiple approximations KR95 . Note that combined is a known-plaintext attack and that it will not be successful if l is large as there will be generally too few p c-pairs with plaintexts in the same input block unless the plaintexts have been chosen such that they lie in a small number of input blocks. The complexity of the attack is considerably reduced if peak imbalance is used.
B Approximation of the Success Probability
We assume that the imbalance used in is the peak imbalance I p :. We rst propose a model of how the various counters in the last-round attack increment. LetJk denote the random variable indicating which counter is incremented for the key guessk when a certain p c-pair is analyzed, i.e.,Jk = gỸ r,1 k , and let J = gY r,1 indicate which counter is incremented for the right keỹ k r .
Model for counter incrementing. Our procedure for nding e ective partition-pairs for DES is similar to the procedure given in Section 6, but we use a simpler approximation of the partitionpair average-key imbalances. Since it is infeasible for 5-round DES to compute the product in 2 for all lists F 0 ; F 1 ; . . . ; F 5 such that jF 0 j jF 1 j . . . jF 5 j, we reduce the number of lists F 0 ; F 1 ; . . . ; F 5 for which we actually compute the product as follows. The S-boxes from which constrained bits emerge will be called active. box We restricted ourselves to lists of bitselecting linear partitions in which all bits that connect active S-boxes are constrained. Moreover, we used an appropriate approximation for the one-round partition-pair peak imbalances. Our procedure provided us with many e ective partition-pairs. We empirically computed the peak imbalances of the most effective partition-pairs found and we veri ed that the empirical peak imbalance depends on the imbalance estimated in our procedure cf. Fig. 3 left, which shows that the imbalance estimate can be used for nding e ective partitionpairs. We then approximated the success probability of attacks exploiting these partition-pairs, performed the attacks many times, and empirically estimated the success probability.
In Fig. 3 right, we compared the approximate success probability and the empirically estimated success probability. Note that to evaluate 1, I is given by 3 in which the peak imbalances are replaced by empirical estimates of averagekey peak imbalances. The di erence between the quantities shown in Fig. 3 can be explained mainly by the fact that the hypothesis of xed-key equivalence is not well satis ed cf. Appendix B. Thus, our results suggest that Theorem 6 gives a good approximation to the true success probability, although the approximation 1 may be crude. We also performed attacks by using di erent imbalance measures. Partitioning cryptanalysis attacks using Euclidean imbalance were generally slightly stronger than attacks using peak imbalance.
The most successful attack on 6-round DES using 256 chosen p c-pairs was obtained when the attack used Euclidean imbalance, when the bit-selecting 64-tuple of the input partition was 81fff9ff ffffffff and when the bit-selecting 64-tuple of the round four output partition was 00000000 0000f000 i.e., when the output block was de ned only by the bits that are linked to the S-box S5 of the fourth round. The approximate imbalance computed in the procedure for nding e ective bit-selecting linear partition-pairs is then 0:0638 and the empirical imbalance is 0:0970. The empirical success probability is 95 for using Euclidean imbalance but is only 74 for using peak imbalance when all 256 p cpairs with plaintexts in one block are used. According to our approximation with q empirically determined as 0:39, the latter success probability should be 95 instead of 74, which is still high enough for most purposes.
This article was processed using the L a T E X macro package with LLNCS style partition-pairs for 5-round DES; right: comparison of the empirical success probability and the approximate success probability of using the peak imbalance for 6-round DES. For many attacks all using di erent partition-pairs whose input partition has 2 64,l blocks where l = 8 light-grey points, 10, 12, or 14 dark points, the empirical partition-pair imbalance and the empirical success probability are estimated after attacking 100 000 random keys. The number of known p c-pairs in the attacks was N = 256 for l = 8 and N = 1024 otherwise.
